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The role of a complete information system as a key determinant of an 
efficient market structure, and in particular the welfare implications of 
information, has been widely investigated over the last few decades. These 
studies have revealed the ambiguous effect information has on economic 
welfare in the presence of risky markets (Hirshleifer, 1971; Green, 1981; 
Campbell, 2001; Schlee, 2001; Eckwert and Zilcha, 2003). 
Grossman and Stiglitz, in a seminal work from 1976, demonstrate the 
hypothesis that information spreads through the market by informed agents to 
uninformed ones. This, in turn, implies that the price is presumed to 
aggregate correctly and efficiently all private information
1. This idea was at 
the heart of the efficient market theory (Fama, 1970). 
Economists typically maintain that the market aggregates information 
correctly. Nevertheless, Grossman and Stiglitz establish this hypothesis using 
a set of paradoxes. They argue that if the information is not aggregated 
efficiently and correctly then there is room for extra profit out of the 
uninformed agents. Informed agents can gain from their advantage by 
interacting with uninformed agents. However, once the market is in 
equilibrium, there are no profits to be made – neither from trading nor from 
the purchase of information. Furthermore, uninformed individuals (those who 
have not purchased information) can infer the information that the informed 
individuals have obtained by observing the market price. As Grossman and 
Stiglitz put it: “… the price system conveys all the information from the 
informed individuals to the uninformed” (1976: 246).  
This kind of argument is based on the equilibrium of markets and not 
on the process of adjustment itself. In fact, markets have been proved to be 
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imperfect and subject to several forms of limitations. The absence of 
complete and accessible information, for instance, can lead to the well-known 
problem of asymmetric information. In this context, situations of asymmetric 
information take place when one economic agent has more information than 
her/his counterpart, and when the price system is unable to convey all the 
information to the uninformed trader. In financial markets, for example, 
situations of asymmetric information occur when traders are unable to assess 
correctly the quality of financial product or when a bank is unable to assess 
the risk associated with a financial transaction. 
An example of the negative effects of such information constrain on 
market economies is provided by financial crises, that often follow what 
appear to be bubbles in asset prices. A bubble is a phenomenon that has the 
same feature of herding (i.e. everybody is doing what everybody else is 
doing). Historic examples of this type of crisis are the Dutch Tulipmania, the 
South Sea bubble in England, the Mississippi bubble in France and the Great 
Crash of 1929 in the United States. A more recent example is the dramatic 
rise in real estate and stock prices that occurred in Japan in the late 1980’s 
and their subsequent collapse in 1990. Norway, Finland and Sweden had 
similar experiences in the 1980s and early 1990s. In emerging economies, 
financial crises of this type have been particularly prevalent since 1980. 
Examples include Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea. 
 
Within this framework it is important to note that an efficient market 
system relies on the quantity of information available as much as on its 
quality (Imbriani, 2004). Hence, state intervention to control over quality and 
quantity of financial markets information was advocated by several authors.
2 
In this context, the effort made by the European Union (as much as by single 
member States) to define a legal framework able to enhance and promote 
efficient and high quality information diffusion in the integrated European 
market it is noteworthy (Imbriani, 2004). 
Surprisingly, a much less debated topic, both in the theoretical and in 
the empirical literature, is the impact of imperfect information of financial 
markets upon income distribution. This work aims, therefore, at bridging 
over this gap by means of a laboratory experiment which will directly 
investigate the effect of quantity  and quality of information upon income 
distribution. We shall maintain that both higher quality and quantity of 
information will improve the income distribution.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the reader with a 
brief review of the recent experimental literature on the informational 
efficiency of markets. Section 3 presents the design of the experimental 
model and offers a description of the characteristics of the experiment. 
Section 4 sets the experimental parameters used and describes the 
characteristics of each experimental treatment as well as the differences 
among them. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes the paper 




2. Informational Efficiency of Markets 
 
Various experimental studies attempted to analyse the role of 
information within financial markets. For the sake of clarity we can 
categorize these studies into three groups: 
•  Studies addressing the issue of dissemination of information from a 
group of identical informed agents (insiders) to a group of identical un-
informed agents. 
•  Studies addressing the issue of aggregation of different pieces of 
information owned by different traders and its dissemination. 
•  Studies addressing the issue of information’s production. 
 
Within the first line of research, Plott and Sunder (1982) studied the 
dissemination of information by running an experiment in which subjects can 
trade in each period a single unit of asset to. The market institution employed 
was a double auction. Following the experiment, the authors found that, 
allowing traders for replications of the same tasks over the experiment time 
frame, markets’ behaviour closely converged towards the predictions of the 
rational expectations theory, where traders decipher the state of the world by 
observing market’s phenomena.  
This approximate convergence (i.e. convergence which occurs with a 
degree of volatility) was also present in an earlier experiment (Smith 1962), 
where convergence to equilibrium was characterised by a persistent noise. 
Moreover, in a recent work, Hey and Morone (2004) showed that whenever 
complexity increases noise increases as well.  
 
With reference to the second group of works, there is clear evidence 
that information’s aggregation problem depends dramatically on markets’ 
features: information distribution, common knowledge, experience of 
subjects, number of assets and so on. For instance, Plott and Sunder (1988) 
designed an experiment on information aggregation in which traders were 
endowed with at least two assets in each period and the dividends of these   4
assets were state-dependent. At the end of each period subjects received the 
realised dividend, but the information that they got in the trading period was 
noisy. The market institution was a double auction. The authors found that, 
first, whenever dividend varied across traders, the market could not aggregate 
information, and, second, that the market information aggregation process 
was inefficient.  
The third type of approach was undertaken by several authors 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980; Verrecchia, 1982; Sunder, 
1992; Copeland and Friedman, 1991 and 1992) who developed noisy rational 
expectation models and addressed the issue of product of information by 
deriving equilibria in which asset markets only partially reveal information. 
In these models, the presence of noises impedes informed traders from 
recovering all the cost of acquiring information, hence generating an 
environment in which information is too costly. 
 
As already mentioned, our paper aims at adding new insights into the 
existing literature by addressing the relationship between information and 
wealth distribution in a market context. By means of a laboratory experiment 
we will investigate the effect of quantity and quality of information present in 
a financial market upon income distribution, showing how both higher 
quality and quantity of information might have a positive impact on it. 
 
 
3. The Design of the Experiment 
 
We have a Society composed by n agents; each one is endowed with a 
quantity of experimental money and m units of an unspecified asset. This 
asset can be valuable or not and it pays its award at the end of each period. 
However, as the award is uncertain, there are two probable ‘states of the 
world’ (with the same likelihood): in the first scenario the award is a certain 
number d greater than zero, whereas in the second scenario the award is equal 
to zero. The experimenter decides the true state when each trading period 
begins. The state is not made known to the agents, who can, nevertheless, 
buy signals (that can have the value 1 or the value 0) which could be 
informative, only to a certain extent, as to the true ‘state of the world’. In 
other words, the probability of getting a signal of 1 is p, if the true ‘state of 
the world’ pays a positive dividend equal to d, whereas the probability of 
getting a signal of 1 is set equal to q, if the true ‘state of the world’ is that the 
dividend is zero. This model is, in many senses, similar to the one adopted by 
Bickchandani et al. Nonetheless, there are two crucial differences: first, in the 
model presented in this paper signals are pricey (as each costs a positive 
amount c); secondly, agents are free to purchase as many signals as they 
want, at any time during the trading period. This means that information is   5
not released sequentially and that the number of signals per agent can be 
greater than 1. These variations indeed alter the nature of the solution of the 
model, but they are clearly necessary in a market environment where trading 
takes place exclusively over the trading period. A further characteristic of the 
model is that agents have full information of the relevant parameters: i.e. the 
positive dividend d, the price of signal c, and the two probabilities p and q. 
As for the trading process, we chose to employ a single-unit double-
auction mechanism, where agents are free at any time to make bids or asks 
and accept existing asks or bids. This trading procedure has shown to be, in 
numerous experiments (however in simpler contexts), a rapid and efficient 
mechanism to reach the competitive equilibrium.  
The experiment was programmed using the Z-tree software of Urs 
Fischbacher and run at the laboratory of ESSE at the University of Bari (the 
pilot), and at the laboratory of EXEC at the University of York.  
We ran four different sessions. They differed in terms of the parameters 
we used. The key parameters of the experiment are the cost of buying a 
signal, c, and the two probabilities p and q. We took two values for the cost c 
and two pairs of values for p and q. With the aim of keeping the experiment 
as simple as possible, we set p = 1 – q in both pairs. Hence, accounting for all 
the possible combinations of these parameters, we ran a total of four different 
treatments. Each treatment was introduced by a briefing Power Point 
presentation containing the correct parameters. 
The payment mechanism was set as follows: agents start-off with some 
experimental money and with m units of the asset. During the trading process 
they can increase or decrease the number of units of the asset that they own 
and, depending upon the prices at which they trade, their stock of 
experimental money will increase or decrease during the period. At the end 
of each treading period the true dividend for that period is announced and the 
appropriate dividend is distributed in experimental money to the asset 
owners. Accordingly, agents will end-up with a stock of experimental money 
at the closing of each period (which may be more or less than the amount 
with which they started that period). An agent’s trading profit for any trading 
period is given by the difference between the final stock of the experimental 
money and the initial one. The overall payment to each agent is simply the 
sum of the profits made over all trading periods of the experiment. There is a 
fixed rate of exchange between experimental money and real money. 
Note that agents can incur losses. To avoid some of the problems 
associated with subjects experiencing real losses in experiments, we endowed 
all agents with a participation fee, which could be used (if the subject agreed) 
to offset potential losses. Once this participation fee is exhausted, any further 
lose has to be covered by the subjects themselves; while some subjects chose 
this option, others chose to leave the experiment once they had used up their 
participation fee.   6
4. Experiment Setting 
 
We had n = 15 agents, each of whom was endowed with 10 Sterling 
Pounds of ‘experimental’ money (actually equivalent to real money as the 
exchange rate was one for one) and 10 units of the asset. The dividend on 
each unit of the asset was either (d = ) 10p or 0p. The experiment consisted 
in four practice periods and 10 real periods. Players were paid only for the 
profits made over the 10 real periods. 
As noted above, the key parameters are the cost of buying a signal c, 
and the two probabilities p and q. We took two values for c, 4p and 6p, and 
two pairs of values for p and q, which were set respectively as: 3/5 and 2/5, 
and 4/5 and 1/5. Combining these values produced four different treatments, 
as described in Table 1. 
The values assigned to these parameters were carefully selected (for 
more details, see: Morone and Hey, 2003). With regard to c, the signal’s cost, 
we predicted that higher values would induce agents to buy less signals. This 
would increase the degree of fuzziness of the market system (due to a 
scarcity of information). In turn, this might result in a more unequal 
distribution of income.  We might therefore expect a less equal distribution of 
income in better informed treatments. As far as the two probabilities are 
concerned, as p rises and q falls the signals become more reliable – hence, the 
quality of the information present in the system improves – and this might 
produce some considerable effect on income distribution. We shall expect a 
more equitable distributed income in Treatment 4 compared to Treatment 1. 
However, a comparison between Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 would not be 
as straightforward.  
 
 
c = 4p c = 6p
p = 3/5 and      
q = 2/5
p = 4/5 and      
q = 1/5
Treatment 3 Treatment 4




Subjects’ pay-off depends considerably upon the parameters choice, 
but evaluating a possible earning interval without information on agents’ 
strategy is a very complicated task.  
A possible strategy is “doing nothing”. In this case agents would get a 
dividend of 10p with probability 0.5 and a dividend of 0p with a probability 
0.5. Their expected pay-off will be 50p in each trading period, and hence,   7
their overall pay-off will be £5 plus the £3 of participation fee. Thus, on 
average, subjects made £8 from participating in this experiment.
3 
However, there was a considerable variation around this average 
figure: some subjects gained less than their participation fee whereas others 




5. Analysis of the Results  
 
Now we will focus our attention on the income distributions. We run 
this experiment for eight different societies. First, we distinguish between 
societies that experience positive growth (d > 0) and societies that experience 
no growth (d = 0). Within each of these two groups we characterise societies 
on the basis of the quality and the cost of information. Hence, we design four 
different scenarios, each one corresponding to a different box in table 2. 
These 4 scenarios differ in terms of the information’s quality and the 
associated cost. We shall maintain that the more and better informed is a 
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Since d was randomly chosen at the beginning of each period, we do 
not have the same number of observations in each scenario. In the following 
table we report the Gini coefficients of the income distribution in the 
different treatments and periods as well as the number of signals acquired and 
the value of d. We also report, in the second part of the table, the average 
level of the Gini coefficient calculated for comparable experiments, and its 
standard deviation.  
                                                           
3 Since the experiment is a zero-sum game for each subject, this will be the amount 
paid out on average.   8
Gini Signal d Gini Signal d Gini Signal d Gini Signal d
Period 1 0.1560 31 0 0.2122 85 0 0.2170 34 0 0.2631 78 0
Period 2 0.3984 46 0 0.3823 73 10 0.1063 33 0 0.1501 73 0
Period 3 0.4969 33 10 0.2716 90 10 0.2887 31 0 0.2579 58 10
Period 4 0.3940 25 10 0.1683 92 10 0.2190 29 0 0.1929 47 0
Period 5 0.5715 29 10 0.3068 72 10 0.4299 29 10 0.3413 43 10
Period 6 0.3295 27 10 0.2811 107 10 0.3043 22 0 0.2704 42 10
Period 7 0.3891 22 10 0.2088 79 10 0.2332 26 10 0.1660 25 10
Period 8 0.2997 18 10 0.2580 58 10 0.1553 23 0 0.2117 22 10
Period 9 0.3646 24 10 0.2106 77 10 0.2741 21 0 0.1879 16 0
Period 10 0.4414 23 10 0.2324 73 0 0.1599 18 0 0.1680 19 0
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
 
 
low/low        
0.277 (sd. 0.121)
low/high       
0.223 (sd. 0.010)
high/low        
0.215 (sd. 0.066)
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0.411 (sd. 0.083)
low/high       
0.261 (sd. 0.062)
high/low        
0.331 (sd. 0.098)






























Comparing Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, we can observe two states of 
the world where information’s quality is the same but its cost varies. Hence, 
we should expect that in the first Treatment the income would be more 
equally distributed (since information cost is lower and subjects should 
therefore purchase more signals). Surprisingly, this is not the case. In fact, the 
Gini coefficient is higher for treatment 1 than treatment 2. Nonetheless, this 
finding is not undermining our prediction that more informed systems (i.e. 
systems where more information is acquired) should be also more equal. In 
fact, interestingly enough, we can observe that subjects purchased more 
information in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1 (see table 3). A possible 
explanation to this odd behaviour is that all our subjects were sophisticated 
enough to make strategic decisions. To our understanding, each trader might 
have predicted that if the information in question is expensive, a relatively 
small number of subjects will buy it. This, in turn, means that they can take 
greater advantages from its purchase. Of course, if everybody behaves in this 
way, a great deal of information will be purchased. Comparing Treatment 1 
with Treatment 2, we have clear evidence that there is a quantity effect. This 
result is also supported by the comparison of Treatment 3 and Treatment 4: 
whenever more information is acquired, the income is distributed more   9
evenly, yet the more expensive the information is the more keen agents are to 
acquire it!  
Comparing Treatments 1 and 3, and Treatments 2 and 4, we can 
investigate the role played by the information quality. In fact, treatments 3 
and 4 have got superior information in terms of quality (i.e. the probability 
value associated to p is higher, whereas the probability value associated with 
q is lower). In all the four cases it is clear that the higher the quality of 
information is, the more equally distributed is the income. This produces 




6. Final  Remarks 
 
The aim of this paper was to analyse, through a simple experiment, the 
effects of information on income distribution. We started with societies 
where, initially, individuals had exactly the same endowments of income, 
information and assets. Moreover, all subjects had access to additional 
information (which was bought at a fixed price). Acquiring more information 
allowed agents to better estimate the values of assets traded in the market. All 
assets traded had the same value. This value v was set equal to or greater than 
zero. If v was greater than zero, the traded asset was valuable. Agents had no 
a-priori information on the assets’ value (i.e. they were ignorant as for the 
value of the asset). During the experiment, players were asked to trade. After 
trading, each player received a pay-off linked to the profit made. The 
experiment was run for eight different societies. We first distinguished 
among societies which experienced positive growth and those which did not. 
Within each of these two groups, we characterised societies on the basis of 
the associated quality and cost of information.  
From the evidence gathered, we can conclude that the better and more 
informed an economic system is, the better distributed is the income. These 
experimental findings confirm our predictions and introduce a new element 
into the picture: the occurrence of strategic behaviours might undermine the 
role of information pricing upon the propensity to buy information. This, in 
turn, might produce an odd result in which the demand curve of information 
is positively sloped. This peculiar result would require further investigation; 
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